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Due “to loss of feedwater flow … occurred as a result of an operator entering 
the condensate polisher control cabinet and, while trying to locate the light 
switch for the lights inside the cabinet, inadvertently ‘hitting the breaker’ 
for the power supply to all the demineralizer vessel discharge valves causing 
these valves to close and feed flow to cease. Met Ed has initiated changes to 
preclude this problem in the future by relocation of the light switch.”2
This article discusses the impact on U.S. nuclear policies of the incident 
at the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania in March 1979 by focusing 
on three interrelated issues: the inescapable connection between the civilian 
and the military dimensions of the nuclear power; the effective mobilization 
from below against nuclear energy in 1970s’ America and the ability of 
anti-nuclear groups to appeal across the political and cultural spectrum; 
and how the political and cultural transformations of the 1970s challenged 
the certainties of the previous decades and hindered the development of 
nuclear energy.
The article is divided in three parts, dealing respectively with the inner 
contradictions of nuclear power, the increasing difficulties of the nuclear 
industry in the 1970s and, finally, the impact of Three Mile Island.
The Wonders and Contradictions of Nuclear Power
“Power too cheap to meter”: that’s what atomic energy promised to 
deliver. The wonders of the atom had been extolled well before it was finally 
split to release unprecedented quantities of energy. When triumph was 
finally achieved – when man at last succeeded in “stealing God’s stuff,” in 
author E. B. White’s famous phrase – there was no way to restrain these pre-
existing, hyperbolic fantasies and dreams (Winkler 29).3 Atomic energy, the 
first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) David Lilienthal 
claimed, “was so gigantic, so terrible, so beyond the power of imagination to 
embrace, that it seemed to be the ultimate fact ... the final secret of Nature.” 
Albert Einstein presented it as “the most revolutionary force since prehistoric 
man’s discovery of fire.” So revolutionary it was, that a divine intervention was 
regularly invoked to explain and justify America’s success. “God” – President 
Truman proclaimed – had “given … through this tremendous discovery of 
atomic energy the unique opportunity to build one single human community, 
on the highest spiritual level, accompanied by unlimited material facilities.” 
Another AEC leader, and nuclear power cheerleader, Lewis Strauss, claimed 
that “the knowledge of the atom” was “intended by the creator for the service 
and not the destruction of mankind.” “A Higher Intelligence,” Strauss 
claimed, had “decided that man was ready to receive” nature’s secret. Cowboy 
singer Fred Kirby concurred: “Atomic power, atomic power” – he cried in a 
song written just one day after Hiroshima – “was given by the mighty hand 
of God.” A few years later, a more profane chair of the AEC, Glenn Seaborg 
stepped outside monotheism and Christianity, to describe the new breeder 
reactor as “the nuclear Goddess of Fertility, so fecund that, while producing 
power in plenty, it also breeds more fissionable material than it consumes” 
(Winkler 28, 36, 137, 138; Herring 10, 14; Bedford 64). 
Scholars and commentators have frequently juxtaposed the alleged 
civilian/sunny side of nuclear power to its military/dark side: the cheerful 
hope offered by the former to the gloom and despair exemplified by the 
latter. In this simple binary, construction was opposed to destruction, 
creation to annihilation, progress to barbaric regression, Heaven to 
Armageddon. Through this reading, civilian nuclear power – the 
“peaceful atom” – acquired an almost tranquillizing and sedative effect. 
It anesthetized the fears nourished by the “un-peaceful” atom and its ever-
expanding destructive potential. And it did so by appealing to larger 
and well ingrained themes of technological progress, promising a clear-
cut solution – a “technofix” indeed – to the problems of energy scarcity 
and dependence, while celebrating once again America’s ingenuity and 
scientific prowess (Boyer; Gamson and Modigliani).
Fascination, if not outright infatuation, with technology and progress 
buttressed this narrative. Praising and magnifying the sunny and progressive 
side of atomic energy served to normalize the abnormal: to guarantee that 
the uncontrollable could well be controlled and exploited. Initially, this 
confidence – this faith in the manageability of the atom – applied to the 
military as much as to the civilian realms. Both revealed the inner dialectical 
tension of all things nuclear, whose basic contradiction lies quite simply 
in their excessive power. Nuclear power was from the beginning a power 
beyond power, and therefore a tool beyond politics. It was so destructive 
that it could not be managed or strategically rationalized; so poisonous 
that it left highly contaminating waste for generations; so mighty that 
absolute safety could never be certain; so invisible and mysterious that no 
one had real and total control over it. 
At first, this tremendous power elicited immense enthusiasm in the 
United States. Just as nuclear weapons promised to endow the United States 
with renewed and full security, nuclear power promised independently-
generated progress and prosperity. It was not just progress that atomic 
energy guaranteed: it was a U.S.-dominated and controlled progress. The 
road to prosperity was thus further connected to the notions of autonomy, 
independence, and freedom. There was nothing to fear (and much to wish 
for) in the atom: “our friend, the atom,” as in the title of a famous 1956 
Disney’s children book, and later film.4 
This celebration of the peaceful and marvelous atom, of the wonders 
it was destined to deliver, continued for two decades or more, in parallel 
with the regular flights of strategic experts into the cuckoo’s nest of 
nuclear war planning, where attempts to rationalize and normalize nuclear 
weapons were discussed and suggested. In this generally nuclear-friendly 
narrative, progress, plenty, and independence guaranteed by nuclear power 
represented the dominant tropes. They were part of a “progress package,” 
sociologists William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani have argued, 
which framed “the nuclear power issue in terms of society’s commitment 
to technological development and economic growth” (4). 
This “progress package” outlived even the end of the U.S. military 
monopoly of nuclear power, the Cold War arms race, the progressive 
abandonment of the idea that a nuclear war could be pursued and won, 
Duck and Cover, the shelter frenzy, and the fallout controversy of the 
late 1950s. Furthermore, it seemed to appeal to political groups across 
the board: right and left, progressive, and conservative. Even the 1962 
Port Huron statement from Students for a Democratic Society applauded 
the possibilities offered by the mighty atom: “our monster cities” – it 
proclaimed – “based historically on the need for mass labor, might now be 
humanized, broken into smaller communities, powered by nuclear energy, 
arranged according to community decision.”
Lauded in the name of progress and modernity, nuclear power was 
somehow de-politicized: inserted into a teleological, and therefore neutral, 
narrative of linear, uncontestable development. Through very modern 
categories – the primacy of the political, the faith in technology, the 
admiration for (and deferential respect to) experts and technocrats – it was 
thought possible to administer, productively use, and ultimately control 
such power-beyond-power (Winner).
A backlash was nevertheless coming. The reaction against civilian 
nuclear power – the first, timid anti-nuclear activism – was initially framed 
in anti-modern and quite parochial terms. Conservationists and conservative 
environmentalists mobilized against the disfigurements nuclear reactors could 
inflict on nature’s aesthetics and pristine landscapes. Safety and contamination 
were at first rarely mentioned, although the fallout controversy and the first 
wave of protests against nuclear tests were destined to have an impact, raising 
the issue of radiation and its effects on population. Destined to become the 
quintessential, sinister symbol of nuclear power, cooling towers were often 
deemed incompatible with the majestic sceneries offered by the sites chosen 
for their construction. The necessary proximity to water – rivers, lakes, and 
sea – needed to cool the reactors did not help supporters of atomic energy. This 
sort of proto-anti nuclear activism developed in the late 1950s. In California, 
the ill-considered idea of building a nuclear plant on the scenic harbor of 
Bodega Bay, 50 miles north of San Francisco, mobilized local residents who 
were able to stop the project. Similarly, citizens’ mobilization blocked the 
proposal of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York to place the 
largest reactor ever built in the heart of New York City, in Long Island, on 
the East River Waterfront (Mazuran; Walker “Reactor at the Fault”; Wellock 
“The Battle for Bodega Bay”).
But it wasn’t this proto (and, in some instances, paleo) anti-nuclearism 
that initially obstructed the development of civilian nuclear power, either 
in the United States or in the rest of the world. The obstacles were more 
mundane: technological breakthroughs were slow to come; costs, then 
as later, remained immensely high; results proved often disappointing. 
The Eisenhower administration, with its unassailable faith in the higher 
efficiency of business, had shifted responsibility to the private sector. In 
1954 the Atomic Energy Act established the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC). The law allowed the dissemination of basic information about 
atomic energy for civilian applications and gave states control over economic 
aspects of nuclear power. More important, AEC was assigned the dual task 
of both promoting civilian atomic energy and guaranteeing public safety 
from its potential hazards – of being promoter and regulator – creating 
what was in all respects a significant conflict of interests. Finally, to further 
promote industry’s participation in nuclear power, in 1957 Congress passed 
the Price-Anderson Act, which limited utilities’ liability to $560 million, 
“effectively transferring liability to the government via taxpayers’ wallets.” 
Insurance companies, in fact, had declined to provide liability coverage for 
private utilities and their major suppliers (Delmas and Heiman 441).
Business, however, was very slow to deliver. “The industry,” Henry 
Bedford has written, “benefited from the reflected prestige of atomic 
scientists, the widespread respect for technical expertise, and the silence 
of governmental agencies about some of the dangers inherent in the new 
technologies.” It could do little, nevertheless, against a technology that 
was moving much slower than imagined, costs that were not abating, and 
hazards that had not yet been solved (66) . The “dazzling nuclear future” 
promised by the industry’s advocates thus did not at first materialize. 
Ubiquitous propaganda and strong public favor notwithstanding, in the 
early 1960s only a handful of private nuclear plants were operational and 
generating power on the commercial grid (Winkler 136; Walker Three Mile 
Island 4-5; Balogh).5
This situation changed dramatically as the decade progressed. Various 
factors contributed to this sudden and unexpected shift: competition 
among builders of nuclear plants; growing concern with air pollution and 
the belief that nuclear energy could offer a solution to it; technological 
improvements; government support (in the form of massive subsidies); and, 
finally, a certain degree of negligence with regard to safety. Again, what 
was happening in the United States reflected a more general worldwide 
trend. The political and cultural climate of the period – the heyday of 
modernization and “techno-arcadia” – proved itself very receptive to 
nuclear technology. As environmental historian John McNeill has written, 
in the 1960s “nuclear power held some of the same political attraction as 
dam building: it signified vigor and modernity” (312).
Between 1966 and 1968, utilities in the U.S. committed to purchasing 
68 nuclear units (there had been only 22 between 1955 and 1965). The 
boom continued in the following years: by 1973, 37 nuclear plants produced 
commercial power or had received operating licenses. Many more were on 
line. The in-house magazine Nuclear Industry confidently proclaimed the 
“virtual collapse of competition from fossil fuels.” In 1971 Glenn Seaborg 
and the physicist William Corliss published Man and the Atom: Building a 
New World Through Nuclear Technology, a paean to atomic energy, a call to 
renewed technological greatness, and a harsh denunciation of what they 
consider to be widespread “anti-rationalism” and “anti-intellectualism.” 
“In the past,” Seaborg and Corliss argued, “we have exploited both man 
and nature. Today it is becoming possible to exploit knowledge” (364-5). 
Richard Nixon predicted that by 2000, nuclear power would provide half 
of the country’s electricity. After the first oil-shock, Nixon proceeded to 
announce his “Project Independence,” which intended to promote a further, 
relevant expansion of nuclear power. His successor, Gerald Ford, was also 
a staunch supporter of atomic energy: “we must rely more and more on 
nuclear power as a major source of energy for the future,” he proclaimed in 
1975 when opposition to nuclear energy was gaining strength nationwide; 
in order to achieve this objective he set the goal of having at least 200 
nuclear power plants in operation within a decade (Walker 7).6
This confidence in the future of nuclear power appeared well-founded. 
Some of the major transformations of the 1970s seemed to open a highway 
to atomic energy. The skyrocketing prices of oil signaled the end of what 
had been the dominant “energy regime” since the 1930s. Along with efforts 
at better conservation, alternative energy sources – including nuclear power 
– offered the only possible solution. In the transition to a new and more
diverse energy regime, it was common to believe that nuclear power would 
play a major role. Furthermore, ten years of negotiations on arms control 
had alleviated the strong nuclear scare of the previous years, removing 
another potential obstacle. Finally, nuclear enthusiasts could continue 
to play the technological card: the appeal of technology and progress, or 
the promise of a “technological salvation” to the energy crisis. “Nothing 
appeals to the American spirit of self-reliant tinkering like a techno-utopia 
… [a] will to believe in a technological fix,” sociologist Todd Gitlin would
later argue. For nuclear supporters, atomic energy embodied that “techno-
utopia” and offered another “technological fix” (Berkowitz 128).7
Reality, however, proved to be very different. Powerful economic, 
social, and cultural trends were operating in an opposite direction, eroding 
the popularity of nuclear energy among the public and establishing the 
conditions for its final failure. At least four factors explain the problems 
of atomic energy in the 1970s. The first was the spread among the public 
of a new ecological awareness. The development and mobilization of 
various environmental groups, at the local as well as national level, was in 
part connected to the more general social upheaval of the period. And it 
was part of the critique of the post-war affluent society: a reaction to the 
excesses – of waste, pollution and contamination – of the post-1945 “age 
of exuberance” (McNeill, “The Environment” 266).
The second obstacle was the plummeting faith in technocrats and 
politicians alike. The 1960s had witnessed some of the most dramatic 
failures of various modernizing schemes, both at home and abroad. Faith 
in politics, as well as expertise, had been badly shattered. One of the 
prerequisites for the development of nuclear energy had been the public’s 
willingness to delegate responsibility to experts and politicians. It is perhaps 
an exaggeration to argue, as political scientist Langdon Winner did, that 
atomic energy requires acceptance of some form of “authoritarianism.” 
Certainly, however, the anti-authoritarian mood of the late 1960s and early 
1970s posed serious and unprecedented problems for the nuclear industry 
(174-6).
Third, utilities made several mistakes, out of arrogance and lack of 
realism. They clearly misread what they could achieve in the political and 
economic climate of the time and ended up overselling – to the public, 
to the politicians, and possibly to themselves – the wonders of nuclear 
technology. In addition, they overestimated the rise of energy prices by 
not taking into consideration the inevitable contraction in consumption 
following the oil shock, while nuclear plants were themselves consumers 
of ever more expensive oil and other fossil fuels, on which they run 
(Lanouette).
Finally, the age of unregulated development was rapidly coming to an 
end. New environmentalism, both mainstream and more radical, targeted 
the lack of regulation and oversight of nuclear power plants. The National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, for example, imposed to consider 
environmental consequences of federally sanctioned initiatives, including 
water pollution. This had a major impact on nuclear plants that use water 
as a coolant and, in the process, return it at a much higher temperature 
(the process is known as thermal pollution) (Walker “Nuclear Power and 
the Environment”).
The nuclear industry thus became one of the main victims of the 
growth (and, also, professionalization) of the environmental movement. By 
operating as effective lobbies, nationally and locally, various environmental 
groups succeeded in passing a vast array of laws which created a complex 
environmental bureaucracy: a “broad and expansive environmental policy 
system,” Robert Gottlieb has shown, “centered around efforts to control the 
environmental by-products of the urban and industrial order” (176). All of 
a sudden, what had been under-regulated became hyper-regulated. Anti-
nuclear groups began to effectively employ litigation and the possibility 
to act as interveners in the permit process. By doing so, they were able to 
postpone, and often sink, planned constructions of new nuclear plants. A 
crucial event in this regard was the creation in 1974 of a new, independent 
regulatory body, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which was 
vested with executive, judicial, and legislative powers. The creation of the 
NRC aimed at solving the original conflict of interests of the AEC, finally 
separating its promotional and regulatory functions. While often criticized 
by nuclear opponents for its alleged timidity, the five-man agency introduced 
new forms of control and supervision that strongly irritated nuclear industry 
representatives. Furthermore, states themselves adopted new regulatory 
measures. Preliminary Environmental Impact Reports (EIR) were often 
asked in order to approve the construction of a new plant. Projects were 
now subjected to unprecedented scrutiny, while litigation and legislation 
empowered citizens and localities (Wellock “Stick It in L.A.!”).
Antinuclear activism, stricter controls and regulations, and higher costs 
increased by the long application procedures hit the nuclear industry very 
hard. Grass-root mobilizations proved particularly effective, especially 
in those regions (the West Coast and part of the East Coast) where 
environmentalism had become a political force to reckon with. Already in 
1970, citizens in Eugene, Oregon, voted for a 4-year delay of a proposed 
nuclear plant. Other, similar initiatives followed throughout the decade, 
the most important being the mobilization of the Clamshell Alliance in 
New Hampshire. Together, these efforts shook public support for nuclear 
energy and placed it in the media spotlight as never before. Even the highly 
moderate Sierra Club urged a nuclear moratorium in 1974 (Joppke 65-69; 
Wellock, Critical Masses 147-51).
The “Not-In-My-Back-Yard” (NIMBY) effect was proving almost 
irresistible, not least because of its quasi a-political (or post-political) 
nature. As historian Thomas Wellock has convincingly shown, “in the 
seventies and eighties, diverse coalitions embraced anti-elitism, localism, 
and the new grass-roots political weapons to gain local control over new 
technology, busing, MX missile basing, low-income housing, waste 
disposal, and development projects. The loss of public faith in the nation’s 
elites and the expansion of public participation in government decisions 
permanently expanded community control over nuclear issues and a host of 
others where citizens did not want to negotiate or compromise” (Wellock, 
“Stick It in L.A.!” 951).
Enter Jimmy Carter 
On nuclear matters, Jimmy Carter had a level of expertise and knowledge 
that was unique among U.S. presidents. A former naval officer with 
training in nuclear engineering, he had been involved in one of the first 
civilian nuclear accidents, when in December 1952 he lead the U.S. team 
assisting its Canadian counterpart in the shutdown of the experimental 
Chalk River Nuclear Reactor, in the province of Ontario, where a partial 
meltdown had occurred.
While not prejudicially hostile to nuclear energy, Carter was no fan of 
it. He did not share the sanguine views of his predecessors and was possibly 
the least pro-nuclear president ever. Two factors shaped his position on the 
issue. The first was political calculations. Carter was deeply aware that 
the controversy over atomic energy could shatter the Democratic Party. 
Environmental groups had become a powerful constituency, supported 
by important public figures such as California governor Jerry Brown and 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Surely, nuclear advocates were not in short 
supply in the party (among them Senator Henry Jackson of Washington 
State and AFL-CIO leaders), but they were less influential. The second, 
crucial factor was the connection, now even more explicit, between the 
civilian and the military dimension of nuclear power (Gavin). 
The battered nuclear industry had placed most of its hopes in the new 
Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors (LMFBR), in which both the Nixon 
and Ford administrations had invested heavily. The cycle of a breeder 
reactor is very different from that of the Light Water Reactors in use in the 
U.S.: it starts with a fissile material that initiates a chain reaction and ends 
with the creation of more fissile fuel (plutonium-239). During the process 
more fissile material is created, reducing the need for uranium mining and 
refining, and thus partially solving the problem of waste, since the spent 
fuel can be reprocessed and the plutonium-239 re-used. However, through 
this sort of recycling, weapon potential material (again, plutonium-239) 
is produced. The fissile fuel produced in the cycle can be used, in other 
words, in the production of nuclear bombs. Light Water Reactors instead 
use low-enriched uranium that cannot be used for nuclear explosives. Until 
the development of the LMFBR, civilian and military technology had 
somehow been kept separate, practically and symbolically. Moving to a 
breeder technology would de facto erase this civilian-military divide.
 Carter strongly believed in the necessity to promote a more 
incisive anti-proliferation policy, particularly after the Indian nuclear test 
in 1974. For this reason, and because of concerns about what he saw as its 
prohibitive costs, he opposed the breeder reactor program, while clashing 
with allies (France and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular) over 
their decision to sell reprocessing plants to countries like Brazil, South 
Korea, and Pakistan, which intended to develop a nuclear arsenal. By 
adopting this position, J. Michael Martinez has argued, “Carter began to 
bridge the gap between American foreign policy on nuclear weapons and 
American domestic policy on nuclear technology.” This bridge, however, 
opened a rift with several important allies and pro-nuclear groups at home 
(Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 215).
Carter announced his position on nuclear energy in a speech he gave at 
the United Nations in May 1976, a few months before his election. “U.S. 
dependence on nuclear power should be kept to the minimum necessary to 
meet our needs,” Carter declared. “We should apply much stronger safety 
standards as we regulate its use. And we must be honest with our people 
concerning its problems and dangers.” “The widespread use of nuclear power 
brings many risks.” They could cause “widespread radiological damage,” 
while “radioactive waste” could be a “menace to future generations and 
civilizations.” “Beyond these dangers, there is a fearsome prospect that 
the spread of nuclear reactors will mean the spread of nuclear weapons to 
many nations.” And, using a historical analogy which would be constantly 
played by nuclear opponents in the following years, he concluded that “by 
1990, the developing nations alone will produce enough plutonium in 
their reactors to build 3,000 Hiroshima-size bombs a year.”8
Supporters of the nuclear industry immediately contested Carter’s 
speech. In a letter to the future President, Senator John Pastore (D-Rhode 
Island), the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, reaffirmed 
his faith in the “safe and prudent development of the peaceful atom.” “I 
view the energy policy of this country, including the role of commercial 
nuclear power, as a vital and inseparable part of the national goal which the 
leaders of our country have been seeking for years,” Pastore stated. Investing 
in nuclear energy was vital to preserve U.S. “strength as a nation.”9 
After the election, energy problems occupied the center stage almost 
immediately: they were the “moral equivalent of war,” Carter claimed. 
During the electoral campaign Carter often presented atomic energy as a 
“last resort,” which required the strictest possible safety precautions. He 
instead placed greater emphasis on conservation, the necessity to modify 
consumers’ habits in order to reduce energy demand, and the possibilities 
offered by renewable sources, solar in particular. Once elected, Carter 
reaffirmed this position, created the Department of Energy, set various 
efficiency standards, and filled his administration with anti-nuclear 
“envirocrats.”10 
But pro-nuclear groups were still well represented: in the country, 
Congress and the Administration itself, where Secretary of Energy James 
Schlesinger loved playing the part of the adult in the room and did not 
share Carter’s hostility to the Breeder Program (National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, instead, supported the position of the President). 
Congress had just turned down an attempt to amend (and reduce) the 1957 
limitation of liability. Several governors and members of Congress explicitly 
criticized Carter, arguing that the energy independence of the United 
States could be defended and guaranteed only through the promotion of 
new, advanced forms of nuclear technology. In particular, Congress and the 
administration clashed over the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR), a 
plant at Oak Bridge, Tennessee, whose construction had been approved 
in 1972. The CRBR was a highly expensive joint government/industry 
program aimed at testing the new breeder technology. After a congruous 
period of time, the reactor was destined to be turned over to utilities11
(Kahn).
While making verbal concessions over the need to preserve nuclear power 
as part of a diverse energy panoply, Carter was adamant in its opposition 
to the Breeder technology, which he considered contrary to the “efforts 
to establish the U.S. as a leader in preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and … a gross waste of taxpayers’ dollars.” Once in office, he 
proceeded to terminate the program. He scrapped the $150 million request 
and allocated $33 million for the cancellation of the CRBR. Congress 
refused and decided instead to authorize a reduced sum ($80 million) to 
the project. Carter issued then the first veto of his administration to block 
the authorization12 (Lefevre).
The breeder controversy was just the clearest example of the dilemmas 
the United States and its president had to face when dealing with 
nuclear matters. The issue of nuclear safety had been embraced by the 
variegated environmental archipelago and its representatives within the 
administration. Meanwhile, high costs and NIMBY-driven local activism 
had posed significant obstacles to the expansion of civilian nuclear power. 
Finally, the explicit connection between civilian nuclear power and arms 
proliferation inserted a further variable in an ever-more complicated and 
ambiguous equation. 
While Congress and the Administration debated (and clashed over) 
the merits of the breeder technology, grassroots mobilization exploited the 
tools now available to block further expansion of atomic energy. Electricity 
produced by nuclear plants had grown exponentially in the previous 15 
years: from 0.3% of the total in 1963 to 4.5% in 1973 to 11.3% in 1979. 
It was still very distant from the targets indicated in Nixon’s “Project 
Independence,” however, and most of the increase had taken place thanks 
to reactors licensed in the late 1960s, which had finally come on-line. After 
the impressive expansion of the previous decade, in the second half of the 
1970s new constructions came to a virtual halt. In 1975, 122 of the 191 
nuclear plants under construction had been deferred, while 9 had been 
cancelled. Between 1975 and 1978 only 11 new plants were ordered (Osif 
et al. 13-15; Walker, Three Mile Island 8-9).
Higher capital costs, more intense (and serious) regulations, and stricter 
safety procedures, all contributed to this first crisis of the nuclear industry. 
Equally, and possibly more important, however, was the mobilization from 
below. A barrage of anti-nuclear initiatives swept the United States in the 
second half of the 1970s. In 1977, several Vermont and New Hampshire 
towns approved nonbinding nuclear construction and transportation 
bans. Montana, Hawaii, and Oregon adopted antinuclear measures that 
gave the power to veto construction to the state legislature or the public. 
In California, 70% of the voters turned down the San Joaquin Nuclear 
Project in the stunning referendum in very conservative Kern county (circa 
100 miles north-east of Los Angeles). In New Hampshire, the Clamshell 
Alliance was formed to oppose the planned construction of the Seabrook 
plant, 40 miles north of Boston (Wellock “Stick It in L.A.!”; Daubert and 
Moran).
These movements proved capable of appealing across political, cultural, 
and social borders. “Wrapped … in a myth of autonomy” and “framed as 
an agrarian versus urban conflict,” as Thomas Wellock put it, the battle 
against the San Joaquin Nuclear Project was waged by an unlikely alliance 
of ultra-conservative agribusiness and progressive environmentalists pitted 
against Los Angeles, big business, and trade unions. At Seabrook, fishermen 
– concerned with thermal pollution and its impact on their jobs – sided
with radical environmentalists (Bedford; Wellock “Stick It in L.A.!” 947; 
Scherpfer; Willis). Kern County is a conservative enclave, which in the last 90 
years has consistently voted – often with very wide margins – for Republican 
presidential candidates. While less conservative, New Hampshire is not 
(and was not, in 1976) a liberal-progressive state: it had a conservative and 
very-pro nuclear Republican governor (Meldrim Thomson), and in 1976 
Gerald Ford easily carried the state. Environmentalism, with its “cross-
cultural character,” and its simultaneous global and local concerns proved 
less divisive than other contemporary social movements and made – from 
time to time, issue to issue – for very strange bedfellows (Guha; McNeill, 
Something New). 
Nuclear energy, however, still had strong and influential supporters. As 
the CRBR saga showed, pro-nuclear members of Congress found a receptive 
ear in Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger. While the “envirocrats” were 
pushing to pay more “attention to safety and security, to waste management, 
and to ensuring that adequate national resources” were “devoted to solar 
and soft path options,” Schelsinger urged a compromise of sorts on the 
CRBR and a less rigid attitude towards nuclear energy in general. Nuclear 
power, he argued, had at least to be placed on “equal footing with coal. 
This would amount to a change” in Carter’s “earlier position on nuclear 
power as ‘last resort’, which has created uncertainty and concern.” Frank 
Moore, Carter’s assistant for congressional liaison, concurred: it was vital 
to avoid giving the impression that the administration “was anti-nuclear” 
even because Carter risked losing support in the South “due in part to 
environmental issues.”13
Schlesinger worked hard to achieve a compromise over the CRBR. He 
advised Carter and Congressional leaders to trade the termination of the 
program and the deferral of breeder commercialization for an aggressive 
program of Research and Development, and the abandonment of any 
prejudicial hostility towards the technology. He didn’t succeed. Many 
members of Congress were willing “to trade ‘mortar’ for ‘mortar’” and not 
a facility (CRBR) for a study of a larger facility, he sympathetically argued. 
Carter was equally adamant: “I would rather go down swinging. A large 
breeder in the near future is a waste of money,” the president wrote by hand 
on one of the many reports produced by the White House.14
Carter eventually failed to terminate the CRBR. He bitterly denounced 
the Congressional decision to proceed with the project but was powerless 
to go further. “Carter presented the decision as a “major, potential 
setback” and the Clinch River breeder reactor as “a technological dinosaur 
... a waste of more than $1.5 billion of taxpayers’ money … an assault on 
our attempts to control the spread of dangerous nuclear materials.” He 
would soon be proved right. Left on hold for several years, the program 
was revived by Reagan in 1981 and finally terminated by Congress in 
1983. The decision was supported even by conservative analysts and think 
tanks, which denounced its uncontrollable costs (originally estimated at 
$400 million, they ended up reaching $8 billion) (Lefevre; Carter, “News 
Conference”; “The Clinch River Folly”). However, the debate over the 
Clinch River Reactor contributed to shape the discussion on nuclear 
energy and to move Carter away from his original, more rigid views. 
In 1978-79, Carter oscillated, undecided about which way to go. He 
progressively toned down his anti-nuclear rhetoric and began to stress 
the need for further research in the new nuclear technology. “Envirocrats” 
were dismayed, environmental groups vehemently protested. Schelsinger 
and several political advisers, instead, presented this middle road as the 
only available and sensible option. 
Many considered Carter’s partial reversal as too little and too late, 
blaming him for the problems in the nuclear industry. Congressman John 
Wydler (R – New York) accused Carter of passively accepting an “Atomic 
Sputnik”: Soviet activism even in the civilian nuclear sector was putting 
the U.S. in an unacceptable “second place in the nuclear league,” he 
argued. The pro-nuclear lobbyist Sam Volpentest, an important fundraiser 
for Washington State Democratic Senators Henry Jackson and Warren 
Magnuson, accused Carter of having “sold the American people down the 
river with his lack of support for nuclear power in this country ... We are 
now second-rate citizens in relation to France, Japan, England – yes, even 
Russia when it comes to nuclear energy development … reducing me, my 
three children and my twelve grandchildren to sole dependency on other 
nations for future energy resources. That’s a sad commentary for this once 
proud and independent democracy.” Annette Stevens, one of the driving 
forces behind the victory of pro-nuclear forces in the 1980 referendum on 
the closure of Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant on the Bailey Peninsula 
of Wiscasset, was even more blunt. Stevens objected to the decision by 
the NRC to shut down for ten weeks the only nuclear plant in Maine, 
presenting it as an “arrogant regulatory intrusion,” further weakening the 
United States. “Japan,” she continued, appealing to phobias that would 
only intensify in the following years, “intends to build 18 nuclear power 
plants in the next six years. Japan, who could not defeat us in a total war, 
threatens us with economic annihilation as we put roadblocks in the way of 
nuclear power plant construction and end depending on costly oil to power 
out factories.”15
Stevens and Volpentest’s harangues were not only directed at the 
wrong target, however, but also well outside the time limit. Nuclear 
energy had been oversold to the public, given its immense costs and the 
inability to find a solution for its intractable waste. Anti-nuclearism had 
become an integral part of mainstream environmentalism and a political 
force one had to reckon with. Civilian nuclear development and anti-
proliferation appeared to be less and less compatible. The problems faced 
by the nuclear industry in the second half of the 1970s were therefore 
already immense. There was one thing it could not afford: a major 
accident. An absolutely remote possibility, nuclear supporters claimed. 
Much more remote than earthquakes, tornadoes, airplane accidents, 
and even “meteorites,” a famous NRC 1974 study prepared under the 
direction of Professor Norman Rasmussen of MIT argued, comparing 
“nuclear risks” and “other societal risks” (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission). Polls reveal that a majority of Americans still believed in 
these reassurances, in the essential safety of nuclear technology. Remote, 
implausible, impossible, the accident nevertheless came, in possibly the 
most unlikely location for a nuclear reactor: a small island in the bucolic 
valley of the Susquehanna River. 
Three Mile Island
“The world has never known a day quite like today. It faced the 
considerable uncertainties and dangers of the worst nuclear power plant 
accident of the Atomic Age. And the horror tonight is that it could get 
much worse. It is not an atomic explosion that is feared; the experts say 
that is impossible. But the specter was raised that perhaps the next most 
serious kind of nuclear catastrophe: a massive release of radioactivity.” 
With those words CBS anchor Walter Cronkite opened his broadcast on 
March 28, 1979. 
The site of a nuclear accident, and not of a meteorite collision, was 
Three Mile Island, an island on the Susquehanna River, just a few miles 
south of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Three Mile Island had two units, TMI 
1 and TMI 2. The first had gone into commercial operation in September 
1974; the second had finally obtained an operating license in February 
1978. Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed), the utility in charge of TMI, had 
originally planned to build the second unit on the site of the Oyster Creek 
Reactor in New Jersey. The weakness of Pennsylvania unions had, however, 
made transferring it to Three Mile Island more attractive. The year before 
the accident had been marked by many minor (and not so minor) accidents: 
pumps failures, problems with valves and cooling system, operators’ 
negligence. The plant, which had cost about $700 million to build, had 
begun commercial operation at the end of 1978, but in the few weeks 
of operation it had often been offline due to technical problems. It was 
also in reaction to the problems at TMI 2 that local groups such as the 
Harrisburg Center for Peace and Justice – and later the very active Three 
Mile Island Alert – had been formed in a state were anti-nuclearism was 
yet very weak.16 
On March 27, the Harrisburg Center for Peace and Justice had finally 
decided to appeal to the Pennsylvania department of health in order to obtain 
more information and data on TMI low-level radioactive emissions.17 A few 
hours later, at 4 a.m. on March 28, the main feed-water system supplying 
water to the steam generators at TMI 2 malfunctioned and shut off. Alarms 
went on: the interruption in the flow of cooling water could cause the 
reactor to overheat and eventually melt. But there was no flow of water 
from emergency auxiliary pumps: due to a maintenance error, two valves of 
those pumps had inadvertently been left closed. The situation precipitated 
when a pressure regulating valve, which had opened to reduce the pressure 
in the reactor, failed to close, thus allowing cooling water from the reactor 
through the valve to the basement’s collecting tank (failures of these valves 
were a common problem, at TMI and other plants). Operators were simply 
untrained for this kind of emergency; they confused the mixed signals 
comings from hundreds of different alarm sounds, and did not promptly 
shut of the valve, thinking that the problem was a possible overfilling of 
the reactor system and not a loss of coolant. The highly contaminated water 
in the reactor’s building basement was then pumped from the collecting 
tank into the auxiliary building; from there the radioactivity found its way 
“to the outside world” through its ventilation system (Osif et al. 25).18
Other mistakes by the operators followed. In response to the loss of 
coolant, high-pressure injection pumps automatically activated but they 
were again shut down, along with four other reactor coolant pumps, 
thinking they could provoke an overfilling, causing the reactor to “go 
solid.” “As a consequence of mechanical failures and operator errors, what 
began as a series of minor malfunctions escalated into a major crisis,” NRC 
historian J. Samuel Walker would later write in his masterful account 
of the accident (Three Mile Island 77). The consequence was the much-
feared meltdown of the reactor’s core and the possibility of uncontrolled 
release of radiation into the environment. The high level of radiation in 
the auxiliary building was in part released through the ventilation system. 
When operators finally understood what was happening, a site emergency 
was called and the cooling system was finally activated. 
At that point the problem was assessing the damage and, obviously, 
the implications for the safety of the population. Alas, confusion, poor 
communication, and mismanagement persisted even in the subsequent 
hours. The owner and operator of the company, Met Ed, tried to minimize 
the accident and offered inconsistent explanations. The State government, 
for its part, was caught unprepared, while local radios and national media 
spread the news, with obvious – and sometimes misinformed – alarm. It 
would take several days, various contradictory announcements, another 
major crisis over a possible explosion caused by an hydrogen bubble in 
the pressure vessel, the direct intervention of the federal government, and 
a spontaneous evacuation of around 150,000 people (instead of the 3,500 
people who had been advised to leave their homes) before the crisis could 
be declared over. 
It is not possible here to discuss the various phases of the Three Mile 
Island drama. What I would like to do is to highlight the political and 
public reaction to the accident and, finally, its impact on nuclear energy 
and anti-nuclearism. 
Carter was at his best during the crisis. He showed unusual leadership 
and personal concern. The president reacted angrily to Met Ed’s behavior 
(during a phone conversation with NRC Chairman, Joseph Hendrie, he 
accused Met Ed of trying to “to protect the power company and not the 
people”), criticized the lack of coordination and information at the plant, 
and did not hesitate to go to Three Mile Island, accompanied by his wife. 
Carter’s would be the last visit of an American president to a nuclear plant 
for more than 25 years, until 2005, when President Bush visited the Calvert 
Cliffs reactor in Maryland, lauding a “completely domestic” energy source 
and declaring that it was finally time for “this country to start building 
nuclear power plants again.”19
Although marked by an embarrassing accident (the dosimeters given 
to Carter and his wife had not been cleared before use, and they signaled 
a very high level of radioactivity so for a few, panicky minutes, it was 
thought that the President had been irradiated), Carter’s visit succeeded in 
restoring confidence – both in the government and NRC – and partially 
placating anxieties among the local population. Middletown’s mayor, 
Republican Robert G. Reid, described the visit as “a shot in the arm … 
people felt … he would not come here if things were really that bad.” In 
retrospective interviews, many stressed the importance of Carter’s visit and 
declared they were “impressed by the fact that Carter and his wife made the 
symbolic gesture to come up” (Walker, Three Mile Island 183).20 
While he was able to demonstrate his technical and managerial 
competence on the issue, Carter proved unable to deal with the political 
implications of the “emotional fallout” caused by the Three Mile Island 
accident. The same was true of most pundits and commentators, who 
generally believed that Three Mile Island had not radically altered the 
perspectives of nuclear energy in the United States. Some commentators 
resorted to the typical tropes of the “package progress.” “What we ought 
to be thinking of is the Titanic disaster,” wrote science and health policy 
expert Daniel S. Greenberg in the Washington Post. “The sinking of the 
unsinkable, it’s worth recalling, had no long term effect on transoceanic 
passenger traffic … the determinants will be the porosity of public memory 
and the fact that while nuclear power might not be indispensable, it is very, 
very useful for a country that likes to live high.” In the same newspaper, 
conservative pundits Rowland Evans and Michael Novak praised James 
Schlesinger’s no-nonsense approach while criticizing Carter’s propensity 
to “appease the Left” on nuclear issues. “The salient fact,” proclaimed 
an editorial of the Wall Street Journal, “is that despite the high drama no 
one was hurt. It remains true that in 25 years of experience with nuclear 
power, no member of the general public – and very few utility workers – 
has suffered any injury from it.” Nuclear power was of course a dangerous 
technology, another editorial of the Journal added: “yet it is far from clear 
that such technologies are intolerable. No one suggests abandoning air 
travel … very few people are willing to give up their automobiles, despite 
the statistical risk. For that matter, much of the public continues voluntarily 
to expose itself to cigarettes.” Columnist Leonard Larsen and the Denver 
Post concurred. “Anti-Nuclear propagandists” had vainly hoped for the 
worse, Larsen argued: for them “the Three Mile Island accident would have 
been a much more satisfactory event if the thing had blown to smithereens 
or even the reactor meltdown had occurred.” At end, however, “despite 
frenzied published and broadcast reports of the escape of radioactive gas … 
there has been no loss of life or injury. Not even a dead fish from the river 
nor a fallen sparrow have been listed as casualties of the ‘disaster’,” Larson 
proclaimed with remarkable confidence. 
In Commentary, Samuel McCracken, later author of the very pro-nuclear 
The War Against the Atom (1982), was instead much more blunt: “the fact 
of the matter is that, taken as a whole, the accident at Three Mile Island 
generally confirms what we have been told about nuclear power. Where it 
does change our understanding, it not only suggests ways we can improve 
nuclear safety, but also that we have in some respects underestimated the 
degree of the safety we have already attained;” John Osborne in The New 
Republic was only marginally less radical: “The anti-nuclear community’s 
view, some of it asserted by crums who’ve been looking for a cause since 
the end of the Vietnam’s war, that the Three Mile Island disaster justifies 
the end of all industrial nuclear power programs and endeavor, is callow 
nonsense.” “The woes of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant … have 
restored a carnival atmosphere to the Left that had been missing since the 
Vietnam War,” The National Review maintained.
Two other themes frequently emerged in the commentaries on the 
accident. The first was the ambiguity of nuclear technology in a period 
when faith in technological solutions, in “techno-fixes,” had drastically 
declined. The second was the striking contrast between the necessity to 
take brave decisions (i.e.: to continue invest in nuclear energy) on the one 
side and the awareness of the paralysis of the decision-making process, 
caused by political polarization and lack of Presidential leadership, on the 
other. “We want somebody to tell us that it will be all right. We are waiting 
for that … there is an unnamable fear to what is going on in Pennsylvania,” 
Roger Simon of the Chicago Sun Times wrote. “We have an overpowering, 
awe-inspiring faith in technology in this country. Technology got us into 
this mess and – most of us believe – technology will get us out.” Three 
Mile Island, the Los Angeles Times proclaimed, was the “end of technological 
innocence.” Nuclear power had still many “mysteries” and “the plant at 
Three Mile Island has sent the country a powerful message … :think again. 
Think hard about how much more deeply you want to be committed to a 
technology about which you obviously have much to learn.” “Nuclear risks 
are in the realm of witchcraft,” pro-nuclear Financial Times correspondents 
David Buchan and David Laschelles wrote. 
If the answers to further investment in nuclear technology had to be 
a yes, as most commentators believed to be the case, Carter had however 
to finally act as a leader and rise “above the technical and administrative 
quarrels that usually preoccupy him, and address the larger principles of 
policy here – those principles that, taken together, comprise the ethics 
of risk.” Offering a bizarre historical analogy, The New Republic presented 
the accident as “the moral equivalent of Verdun.” “Nuclear power” – the 
magazine argued in its first editorial on Three Mile Island – “is the classic 
illustration of our present political paralysis. It is an important social 
decision that is not being made, while the costs of indecision are probably 
greater than the costs of a wrong decision either way” (why a wrong decision 
was better than indecision was left to the readers to understand). 
Conclusions
Aside from the usual suspects – The Nation, The Progressive, and 
publications of environmental groups – one would struggle to find analyses 
that not only called for terminating any investment in nuclear energy but 
actually predicted it. In fact, Three Mile Island sanctioned the virtual freezing 
of the nuclear industry in the United States. According to Nixon’s “Project 
Independence,” by the year 2000 nuclear power would have provided 50% 
of U.S. electrical production. Today, it provides approximately 19% of the 
total electrical output. The 104 reactors currently in use were all licensed 
before 1974, although 16 license applications to build 24 new nuclear 
reactors have been submitted since mid-2007, and it is now expected that 
4-6 new units will come on line by 2020. Comparing the BP spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico to Three Mile Island and denouncing Barack Obama’s 
“fantasy of energy independence,” James Schlesinger recently complained 
that “Three Mile Island” had “killed the nuclear industry for 30 years.” 
Candidly reflecting on the accident, NRC commissioner Victor 
Gilinsky offered a more sober assessment some years after the accident. 
“Can we live with nuclear energy?” he rhetorically asked. The answer was 
“yes, but only if we are willing to pay the price of living with dangerous 
high technologies. That price is extraordinary care, discipline and superior 
craftsmanship” (18-20). Those were the basic preconditions for continuing 
the expansion of nuclear power after the Three Mile Island accident: 
acceptance of risk; high discipline (in the form of strict regulations and 
monitoring); higher costs imposed by such discipline (and therefore heavy 
public subsidies); willingness of individuals and communities to subordinate 
their interests to a higher common good; and trust in technocrats and 
politicians. It is easy to see how these conditions were mostly lacking after 
1979. Decreasing oil prices made investing, politically and economically, 
in nuclear technology even less attractive. Nuclear technology – with its 
“mysteries” and contradictions – was inherently divisive and polarizing. 
As Samuel Walker underlined, “Like a religious controversy, the nuclear 
power issue was so emotional in part because it could not be resolved 
through available information. All the key questions surrounding the 
technology … were subjects of dispute among experts” (2004, 25). Yes, 
dangers were widespread and more people had died from plane crashes 
and coal pollution. But the mysterious and invisible nature of radiation 
posed it in a league of its own, practically and, even more, symbolically. 
The menace was perceived as eluding the body and the senses – of being 
ultimately beyond control (Erikson, Parr).
The effects of Three Mile Island – of the small doses of radiation released 
during the crisis and afterwards – are still impossible to assess. In the 
aftermath of the accident there were frequent claims about the dramatic after-
effects; sensational stories about birth defects, malformations, and animals’ 
abnormalities circulated widely. They proved to be unfounded. The vast 
majority of the studies undertaken in the past thirty years have minimized 
the impact on the health of local residents. Relying on earlier assessments, 
Carter’s Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Joseph A. Califano Jr. 
estimated that there could be only one excess cancer in the area (Hatch et al., 
“Cancer Near”; Hatch et al., “Cancer Rates;” Talbott et al, “Mortality Among 
the Residents”; Talbott et al., “Long-Term Follow-Up of the Residents”). But 
more recent works have resuscitated the early controversy. Epidemiologist R. 
William Field has observed that the counties around TMI “have the highest 
regional radon potential in the United States.” And in a highly controversial 
article in the September/October 2004 “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,” 
Joseph Mangano, the National Coordinator for the Radiation and Public 
Health Project in New York, challenged early reassuring studies, using data 
on deaths (excluding accidents, suicides, and homicides) among those born 
near the site of the accident in the late 1970s. According to these numbers, 
the percentage is significantly (and consistently) higher than the Pennsylvania 
state average. Furthermore, prior to the accident, cancer death rates among 
children were 24% below the national rate, yet since the accident it has been 
30% higher (31-35, Field 214-17).
Judgments are difficult. Mangano’s samples have been criticized for 
being too small and selective. The controversy over the “real” effects of the 
accident on population brings us back to the peculiarity of nuclear power – 
power-beyond-power/power too powerful to be controlled and used – and 
the impossibility to neatly separate its military and civilian dimensions. 
In the aftermath of the accident, the common analogical reference adopted 
in both commentaries and personal memoirs was not another natural 
catastrophe (such as the flood experienced in 1972 by Three Mile Island 
residents), but Hiroshima. In 1972 “I could see what I was fearing: the 
water,” a local school teacher declared. “But with radiation, you couldn’t 
see it. I think it’s the unknown that makes it very hard to accept.” It was 
frightening “in the sense that it’s unknown. Radiation is invisible … if a 
flood comes, or a hurricane, you normally have warning …Camus’s The 
Plague came to mind,” added a Dickinson college teacher. According to 
a local police officer, “in a hurricane or flood you can see the damages … 
but here they say, ‘this could happen, this could happen. There could be 
invisible radiation seeping out’. It’s a different type of fear.” “All I could 
think of was just the great big … cloud of Hiroshima and so forth and 
then total devastation and nothing,” another interviewee affirmed. It 
was impossible not to picture an “explosion” of the plant: “Kind of like 
someone dropped a bomb on Hiroshima or something,” an 18-year-old 
commented. “You think about what happened in Hiroshima … the talk of 
Hiroshima would come up,” another interviewee emphasized. “I thought 
of the nuclear bombs exploding,” a 25-year-old (born therefore in 1954) 
said. “Like in Hiroshima … it was frightening because you had so many 
unknown conditions.” “Flood,” another interviewed commented, “you can 
go someplace or there is always an answer for it. In a hurricane you can run 
to the basement at least. But something you can’t see, that’s what you don’t 
have no control over” [sic].21 Perhaps it was inevitable. Hiroshima was “the 
prototype of human experience with nuclear disaster prior to the Three 
Mile Island Emergency,” wrote Lonna Malsmheimer, the coordinator of the 
TMI Oral History project at Dickinson College. (35) 
Three Mile Island contributed to a simplified nuclear narrative in which 
radiation was “one,” invisible and indivisible, whether it came from weapons 
or reactors. The peaceful and friendly atom, the luminous and progressive 
face of nuclear power, ceased practically to exist. After 1979 there was no 
space in the public discourse for nuclear fantasies and wonders. At most, 
not abandoning nuclear power could be justified as a form of sacrifice to 
which people were called in the name of a superior good (independence, 
sovereignty, even consumption), not as an opportunity – a way to the 
future – but as an agonizing necessity. The indivisibility, in most people’s 
perceptions, of military and civilian nuclear power helps to explain another 
element of Three Mile Island: the inevitable, global reverberations of all 
things nuclear. Following the accident, protestors took to the streets across 
the United States and Europe: “we are all Harrisburg” became the slogan 
of many of these protests. It was a crucial moment in the emergence of a 
powerful transnational anti-nuclear movement, where traditional pacifism 
(anti-nuclear weapons) now combined and merged with the new political 
environmentalism (anti-nuclear energy).
Successive choices on nuclear energy varied from country to country. The 
response to Three Mile Island showed, however, how NIMBY-like forms of 
activism and protests matched with global sensibilities and mobilizations. 
Not accidentally, the atom was able to catalyze this connection between 
the local and the global. Nuclear power and the fear (and possibility) of 
radiation, in weapons as well as reactors, came to embody the frightening 
face of interdependence: of a danger that, for its nature, could not be limited 
and contained; that could move – hidden and lethal – across borders and 
nations. 
Finally, in the case of the United States as well as other countries, deep 
political and cultural trends were creating an environment even less favorable 
for nuclear power. The post-1970s age of confusion, fragmentation, and 
“fracture” could not be a propitious period for the resurrection of the battered 
nuclear industry. This resurrection would have required conditions that 
were simply missing: a strong state; national cohesion; sense of a collective 
destiny; readiness to sacrifice. Deindustrialization was not conducive to 
investments, subsidies, and research in a heavy industry such as the nuclear 
one. Once cheap oil from the Middle East began to flow again, and the 
U.S. President made clear that deficits and debt were not major concerns 
anymore, nuclear advocates found themselves even more isolated. 
The loss of faith in experts, science, and politicians made nuclear 
technology even less appealing and defendable. New deregulatory dogmas 
clashed with an industry that needed to be hyper-regulated to become 
again acceptable. The emphasis on choice and agency, instead of structure 
and power, inevitably damaged the nuclear industry. The “rediscovery of 
the market” (Rodgers 41) rocked an industry that – claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding – was simply not profitable (to the point that no attempts 
were ever made to quantify the costs of virtually perennial nuclear waste). 
The increasing emphasis on the “here and now” ran against the long-term 
investments and careful planning required by nuclear energy. “Populist 
market optimism,” “Pessimism about possibilities of governance,” collective 
disaggregation “into a field of microplayers” – all the different formulas 
recently used by Daniel Rodgers to describe the post-1970s fractured and 
pulverized United States – highlight conditions that a nuclear industry 
long complacent and unable to deal with its contradictions simply could 
not handle. 
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